Yudong Gao
Zongjian Ding
Linghan Chen
Yajing Chen
Yu Xinglin
Jiale Liu
Shan Huang
Mingjun Cheng
Feed-forward 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) reconstructs a 3D scene from sparse images in one forward pass. Its shared pretrained weights also expose a supply-chain attack surface. Existing Neural Radiance Field and 3DGS backdoors modify individual scenes and activate at selected viewpoints; they do not install persistent behavior in shared generator weights. We introduce GhostSplat, an input-triggered backdoor that installs such behavior in feed-forward 3DGS. A low-amplitude pattern added to the input images causes the poisoned generator to render an attacker-chosen payload on unseen victim scenes. Anchoring the payload to a 3D point and reprojecting it into each target view makes the payload multi-view consistent. Exact projection onto the generator's representation-specific consistency set leaves a realized payload unchanged because the output already belongs to that set. The GhostSplat training framework succeeds across three architectures (MVSplat, pixelSplat, DepthSplat) and two datasets (RealEstate10K, ACID). Its strongest evaluated injection and deletion settings reach 96% and 100% ASR, respectively, with zero observed false positives while surviving JPEG, blur, and resampling. Defenses that use only that exact projection are therefore insufficient; effective mitigation requires information or intervention beyond same-set consistency projection.
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