Paper

Yueyan Dong

Minghui Xu

Qin Hu

Yinhao Xiao

Qi Luo

Yechao Zhang

Yue Zhang

Xiuzhen Cheng

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) has become a popular solution for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) in federated settings, dramatically reducing update costs by introducing trainable low-rank matrices. However, when integrated with frameworks like FedIT, LoRA introduces a critical vulnerability: clients submit $A$ and $B$ matrices separately, while only their product $AB$ determines the model update, yet this composite is never directly verified. We propose Gradient Assembly Poisoning (GAP), a novel attack that exploits this blind spot by crafting individually benign $A$ and $B$ matrices whose product yields malicious updates. GAP operates without access to training data or inter-client coordination and remains undetected by standard anomaly detectors. We identify four systemic vulnerabilities in LoRA-based federated systems and validate GAP across LLaMA, ChatGLM, and GPT-2. GAP consistently induces degraded or biased outputs while preserving surface fluency, reducing BLEU by up to 14.5\%, increasing factual and grammatical errors by over 800\%, and maintaining 92.6\% long-form response length. These results reveal a new class of stealthy, persistent threats in distributed LoRA fine-tuning.

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The week in radiance fields, every Monday.

Gaussian Splatting News on YouTube

The week in radiance fields, every Monday.

Gaussian Splatting News on YouTube

The week in radiance fields, every Monday.